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RESPONSES TO THE CONFERENCE
DECONTEXTUALIZING THE CHILD CLIENT:
THE EFFICACY OF THE ATTORNEYCLIENT MODEL FOR VERY YOUNG
CHILDREN
Annette R. Appell*

M

S. Smith gives birth to an HIV positive, drug-exposed baby girl
and informs the hospital staff that she wants to place her daughter for adoption. The next day, Ms. Smith checks out of the hospital,
leaving behind her newborn, who becomes known as Baby Girl Smith.
The hospital calls child protection services to report the incident. For
two weeks, Baby Girl Smith remains in the hospital while the child
protection agency attempts to meet with Ms. Smith to obtain her written relinquishment of parental rights so the agency can place her baby
in a preadoptive home. Unfortunately, although Ms. Smith consistently reaffirms her plan for her daughter, the agency fails to have Ms.
Smith complete the necessary papers. No father steps forward or registers with the putative father's registry. The agency submits a petition of the case to juvenile court and searches for a foster-adoptive
home for the baby. The juvenile court appoints an attorney to represent Baby Girl Smith as lawyer and guardian ad litem ("GAL") in the
child protection proceedings.
Corey Thomas, a healthy, happy ten-month-old, is meeting his developmental milestones early. Ms. Thomas is his mother. She is an
eighteen-year-old ward of the juvenile court herself. She refuses to
cooperate with her caseworker and is, as are many eighteen-year-old
girls, preoccupied with boys. She has failed to have Corey's immunizations updated. Ms. Thomas' aunt has cared for Corey on and off
during his brief life and is seeking legal custody of him; she has raised
Corey's two-year-old sister Marcess since birth. A foster parent is
raising Ms. Thomas' other child. The domestic relations court appoints an attorney to serve as Corey's lawyer and GAL for the custody proceedings.

* Attorney and law teacher at the Children and Family Justice Center of Northwestern University School of Law Legal Clinic. I thank Center social worker Monica
Mahan for her incredulity about the legal ethical limitations facing attorneys who
represent children, and Bernardine Dohrn for reviewing an earlier draft of this

Response.
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INTRODUCTION

Courts and legislatures are increasingly recognizing children as people rather than as property. So too lawyers, child advocates, and legal
scholars have been recommending that children be afforded legal representation that approximates, as nearly as possible, the attorney-client relationships enjoyed by competent adult clients.' The Proposed
American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases ("Proposed ABA
Standards") mandate the attorney-client model for attorneys appointed to represent children, and thus represent a welcome development in strengthening the protection of children's legal rights. The
conferees at the Fordham University School of Law Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children2 (the "Conference") also recommended that attorneys for children with capacity
must represent their clients as if they were adults.3 But, as the conferees also recognized, the attorney-client model is challenged when clients are not developmentally capable of defining the scope of
representation or are capable of guiding some legal decisions but not
others.4 In light of these challenges, the conferees developed thoughtful guidelines for attorneys representing children lacking capacity.5
These guidelines include Recommendations that the attorney listen to
the child's own words and gather information from other sources to
get to know the client as a unique individual. The guidelines provide
1. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the
Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1655, 1696-97 (1996); Linda L. Long, When the Client is a Child- Dilemmas in the
Lawyer's Role, 21 J. Faro. L. 607, 608 (1982-83); Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of
the Child in ProtectionProceedings: The Determinationof Decision-Making Capacity,
17 Farn. L.Q. 287, 288-91 (1983); Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counselfor Children in Civil Litigation, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1571, 1573-74
(1996); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counselfor Children,27 Faro. L.Q. 349, 35053 (1993).
2. The Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children was
held at Fordham University School of Law, New York, New York, on December 1-3,
1995.
3. Recommendations of the Conference on EthicalIssues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Recommendations of
the Conference] (part I).
4. Rule 1.2(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(a) (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules]. Similarly, Ethical Consideration 7-7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "[T]he authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and... such
decisions are binding on his lawyer." Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC
7-7 (1981) [hereinafter Model Code].
5. Report of Working Group on Determining the Best Interest of the Child, 64
Fordhain Law. Rev. 1347, 1349-50 (1996) [hereinafter Report-Determining Child's
Best Interest]. The conferees incorporated this into part IV of the Conference Recommendations. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, part IV.
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an excellent model for the representation of precapacitated 6 child clients. However, the guidelines do not provide sufficient direction for
the representation of very young clients-newborns to toddlers-who
may be nonverbal and lack both the developmental capacity to make
reasoned decisions and a history of sufficient duration or depth to provide context and guidance to the attorney.7
Moreover, the conferees premised these guidelines on the appointment of an attorney to represent precapacitated children. Perhaps because the purpose of the Conference was to address ethical issues in
the legal representation of children by attorneys, it did not systematically address the prefatory issue of whether children should be represented by attorneys in the first place. Nevertheless, the Conference
endorsed mandatory appointment of counsel in a number of proceedings involving children.8 Yet, if the essence of the attorney-client relationship is the attorney's service at the client's direction,9 it makes
little sense to appoint an attorney to represent a very young child such
as an infant or toddler who unquestionably cannot direct that lawyer.
In fact, this lack of direction for lawyers representing precapacitated children can too easily lead to abuses. For example, an attorney
appointed to represent the precapacitated child may also be appointed
as GAL or might assume, de facto, the role of GAL and substitute the
attorney's own judgment as to the appropriate outcome of the case. 10
6. I use "precapacitated" instead of "incapacitated" or "without capacity" to refer specifically to very young children who do not have the developmental capacity to
direct their attorney but who, unlike most other incapacitated clients, were never capacitated and hopefully will be in the future. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigmfor
Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 Fordham L. Rev 1399, 1400-01
(1996) (discussing the difference between lawyering for the once-capacitated and the
precapacitated client); Wilber, supra note 1, at 361-62 (same).
7. See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1399-1400 (describing the limitations peculiar to representing young children); Wilber, supra note 1, at 362-63 (same).
8. Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, part VIII.A.1 (recommending that attorneys be appointed in abuse and neglect, termination of parental
rights, foster care, delinquency, status offense, and mental health commitment proceedings); see also Ross, supra note 1, at 1576 (arguing that all children with capacity
should be represented by attorneys inlegal proceedings).
9. This is my assumption for purposes of this Response. For alternatives, see
Federle, supra note 1, at 1656 (arguing that the role of attorneys is to empower their
clients), and Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in
Context, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1473, 1478 (1996) (rejecting the lawyer as agent and
promoting lawyer as fact finder and value promoter). Although Federle's empowerment theory is not necessarily inconsistent with the attorney as agent and provides an
attractive framework for the attorney-client relationship, Margulies' notion of lawyer
as value promoter is troubling given the lack of societal agreement regarding what
values to promote. See John E. Coons et al., Deciding What's Best for Children, 7
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 465, 480-82 (1993) (discussing value pluralism);
Wallace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in
Search of a Standard, 16 J. Fain. L. 1, 12 (1977-78) (noting difficulty in making predictions about future outcomes).
10. Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, part IV.B.1; Mlyniec, supra
note 9, at 11-13; Ramsey, supra note 1, at 305.
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These essentially unreviewable decisions may be guided by the attorney's conception of the child's best interest, by the attorney's understanding of what is generally considered to be in children's best
interest, or by the attorney's own beliefs about what is right."
Indeed, this lack of standards pervades decision making on behalf
of children, not only because judges may rely on the child's attorney
when making decisions,' 2 but also because decision-making principles
themselves are either inconsistent or applied inconsistently.' 3 Thus,
decisions for precapacitated children may be based on institutional,4
political, or personal biases, and not on the children's actual needs.'
One would hope that attorneys for children would help focus decision
making on the child and away from adult interests.' 5 For this reason, I
endorse the call for the application of the attorney-client model to the
legal representation of children; including the child's voice in the proceeding provides balance and an otherwise missing viewpoint to the
proceedings. 6 Nevertheless, the attorney for the precapacitated child
is rudderless because the client is without a voice sufficient to direct
representation.
This Response challenges attorney representation of these very
young children. 7 Because attorneys bring to these relationships limi11. Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1415; Jonathan 0. Hafen, Children's Rights and
Legal Representation-The ProperRoles of Children, Parents,and Attorneys, 7 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 423, 426 (1993); Ramsey, supra note 1, at 301-02;
Mlyniec, supra note 9, at 9-10. But see Robert H. Mnookin, In the Interest of Children: Advocacy, Law Reform, and Public Policy 515-16 (1985) (discussing how, despite inherent difficulties in representing children and class action members, those
attorneys who specialized in such representation served the interests of their named
clients in class action litigation.)
12. Hafen, supra note 11, at 451.
13. Theodore J. Stein & Tma L. Rzepnicki, Decision Making In Child Welfare:
Current Issues and Future Directions, in Child Welfare, Current Dilemmas-Future
Directions 259, 261-63 (Brenda McGowan & William Meezan eds., 1983).
14. See, e.g., id. at 273 ("Children have been removed from the care of their parents because the court does not approve of their lifestyle... [and not based on]
evidence of harm to a child."); Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Monitoring Attorney Performanceand Evaluating Program Outcomes: A Case Study of Attorneys
for Abused and Neglected Children,40 Rutgers L. Rev. 1217, 1239-40 (1988) (noting
that a child's race, parent's gender, and other factors unrelated to the severity of the
problems which brought the cases into court had the most bearing on custodial
decisions).
15. Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 1240. Kelly and Ramsey note: "[C]hildren
with similar problems could receive widely disparate treatment depending on factors
not intrinsically related to their needs. It is sensible to infer that children such as
these might have benefited greatly from sustained and independent advocacy on their
behalf." Id.
16. Ramsey, supra note 1, at 295-98.
17. Accordingly, this Response does not address proceedings which tend to involve older children, such as delinquency, abortion, special education, emancipation,
and the right to marry. Nor does this Response tackle the thorny questions of representation of preadolescent, school-age children, although much in it may be applicable to this group. Choosing and evaluating normative models of representation for
that age group presents the most complex and ethically challenging area for child
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tations arising out of the absence of ethical guidelines for appropriate
conduct, inadequate training, and ethical barriers to effective representation, lawyers are all but precluded from developing a multidimensional picture of their clients. The autonomization implicit in
appointing counsel, coupled with specific ethical prohibitions which
limit the ability of attorneys to gather information about clients who
cannot provide that information themselves, serve to decontextualize
the young client. That is, by first separating the child from those persons who know the child best, and then erecting barriers to constructing or reconstructing the child's world, the appointment of legal
counsel isolates the child from the attorney, and both the child and the
attorney from the child's past and future experiences.
In this Response, I argue first that the ethical rules governing the
attorney-client relationship do not provide sufficient guidance for attorneys representing precapacitated children. Next, I argue that, because legal training does not impart the skills, knowledge, and
disposition necessary to represent precapacitated clients ethically and
effectively, attorneys are not a particularly good choice for representing this group. Third, I highlight two ethical prohibitions that interfere with the attorney's attempt to investigate and promote very
young children's interests. Finally, I recommend that specially-trained
social workers or Other adults be appointed to represent this target
group, and that these representatives should themselves be represented by attorneys. Nevertheless, I conclude with a caution against
applying this model to capacitated children who have an active and
often wise voice to share with the court.
I.

ETHICAL RULES Do NOT PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR ATTORNEYS
REPRESENTING INCAPACITATED CHILDREN

The ethical rules governing lawyers are based on the notion that
they are expert servants, that the essence of the attorney-client relationship is that attorneys act on behalf of their clients' stated objectives. 18 Without the client, we lawyers are, so to speak, nothing.
Lawyers' own goals, interests, and objectives are (or should be) irrelevant to the court or to the transaction. Thus, lawyers may not normally substitute their own opinions regarding the goals of
advocates and attorneys, and calls for a fuller treatment than is permitted here. See
generally Emily Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children's Misperceptions
of Their Lawyers' Roles, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1699, 1699-1762 (1996) (providing an
extremely thoughtful analysis of ethical issues in the legal representation of young
child clients); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1505 (1996) (same).
18. Emily Buss recognizes that those attorneys practicing under the GAL model
(in which the attorney substitutes his or her own decisions for the client's) "abandon
the most fundamental aspect of the client-lawyer relationship" on which ethical principles are based. Buss, supra note 17, at 1731.
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representation for their clients.' 9 Instead, the ethical rules mandate
that lawyers follow their clients' manifested legal objectives. We lawyers are hired or appointed to help clients navigate the legal systema system our profession constructed over time and with which we (by
virtue of our training) are most familiar.
When representing clients without decision-making capacity, the
Model Rules instruct lawyers to "as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client."2 When the
client cannot act in his or her own interest, the Model Rules provide
that lawyers "may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action with respect to a client."'" Although the comments
to the Model Rules state that "the lawyer often must act as de facto
guardian" for the disabled client, 2 the Model Rules do not mandate
the substitution of the attorney as the decision maker on behalf of the
client, but instead suggest that the guardian assume such a role.2 3 The
Model Code more clearly permits the attorney to make decisions on
behalf of the incapacitated client without a guardian. 24 Unlike the
Model Rules, the Model Code does not suggest the attorney seek appointment of a guardian for the incapacitated client. The Model Code
states that when the lawyer is compelled because of the client's disability'and absence of a guardian to make decisions for the client, "the
lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with
care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client."' By contrast, the Model Rules do not provide even that limited direction to
the attorney representing incapacitated clients.
Despite this lack of guidance for the attorney representing a precapacitated client, many jurisdictions mandate the appointment of an
attorney for children of any age in child protection proceedings, 26 and
19. See discussion infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
20. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 1.14(a).
21. Id. Rule 1,14(b).
22. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt.
23. Id. Rule 1.14.
24. Ethical Consideration 7-12 of the Model Code provides:
If a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be
compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client....
If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel the
lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the
interests of his client.
Model Code, supra note 4, EC 7-12.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 705, para. 405/2-17 (Smith-Hurd 1995); see also
Rebecca P. Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings:
Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 Fain. L.Q. 327, 327-28 (1993) (stating
that 46 states and territories have partially implemented statutes that require a GAL
to serve as an advocate); Robert Kelly & Sarah Ramsey, Do Attorneys for Children in
ProtectionProceedingsMake a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of Representation
Under Conditions of High JudicialIntervention, 21 J. Faro. L. 405, 408 n.9 (1982-83)
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permit the appointment of one in private custody disputes.2 7 In fact, if
the drafters of the Proposed ABA Standards have their way, the ABA
will adopt a policy favoring the appointment of an attorney for every
child in all child protection proceedings and all other proceedings involving allegations of parental misconduct or nonfeasance.2" Yet if
one of the fundamental tenets of legal ethics is obedience to clients'
decisions, then removal of that foundation (as in the case with precapacitated child clients) leaves the ethics rules logically and practicaly on shaky ground.2 9 Although the Proposed ABA Standards
improve greatly upon the vagaries and vacancies of the Model Rules
and Model Code as they relate to precapacitated clients, the Standards nonetheless fail to answer the fundamental question of what attorneys should do when their clients are infants.
By contrast, the Fordham conferees addressed the role of attorneys
representing precapacitated clients to a greater extent than the Proposed ABA Standards.3" The conferees approached this question
from two directions. Professor Guggenheim and, implicitly, the drafters of the Proposed ABA Standards (some of whom were among the
(listing 22 states mandating appointment of attorneys in child protection proceedings
and another 15 which permit such appointment).
27. Linda D. Elrod, Counselfor the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now,
26 Fain. L.Q. 53, 55-56 (1992) (noting that 21 jurisdictions authorize and two jurisdictions mandate appointment of attorneys for counsel for children in contested divorce
custody disputes); see also David Peterson, Comment, JudicialDiscretion is Insufficient: Minors' Due Process Right to Participatewith Counsel when Divorce Custody
Disputes Involve Allegations of Child Abuse, 25 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 513, 516
(1995) (reporting that although only one state mandates appointment of attorney or
GAL for children in all disputed custody cases, a majority of other states only permit
such appointment).
28. The Preface to the Proposed ABA Standards provides:
All children subject to court proceedings involving allegations of child abuse
and neglect should have legal representation as long as the court jurisdiction
continues. These Abuse and Neglect Standards are meant to apply when a
lawyer is appointed for a child in any legal action based on: (a) a petition
filed for protection of the child; (b) a request to a court to change legal
custody, visitation, or guardianship based on allegations of child abuse or
neglect based on sufficient cause; or (c) an action to terminate parental
rights.
Proposed American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 Family L.Q. 375 (1995) [hereinafter
Proposed ABA Standards].
29. See Buss, supra note 17, at 1734 (maintaining that, in shifting decision making
from the client to the lawyer, "children are divested of all the ethical protections owed
to clients ... for they lack the status that entitles them to (indeed, justifies) those
protections").
30. See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1399-1400; Margulies supra note 9, at 1474;
Peters, supra note 17, at 1564-69; Report-Determining Child's Best Interest, supra
note 5, at 1348; Report of the Working Group on Determining the Child's Capacity to
Make Decisions, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1339, 1340-45 (1996); Report of the Working
Group on Interviewing and Counseling, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1351, 1352-56 (1996);
Report of the Working Group on the JudicialRole, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1389, 1389-91
(1996).
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conferees) focused on defining the scope of representation, i.e., the
purpose for which the attorney is hired or appointed. Attention to the
scope of representation is critical when representing precapacitated
clients because, as discussed above, the client normally defines the
objectives of representation. Other conferees chose not to address
this fundamental question and instead focused on how and when to
make decisions on behalf of these children.31 This second approach
constitutes another important analysis given the challenge that children's attorneys face when representing clients incapable of making
decisions.
As discussed next, ascertaining or developing rules for defining the
scope of representation is crucial. However, defining the scope purely
with regard to positive legal standards may disregard the client's individuality. The client's individual circumstance offers a reference
which provides the attorney with invaluable guidance when the child's
legal interests are unclear or when protecting those interests may
harm the child. Nevertheless, as discussed in part II, a focus on decision-making standards is not, by itself, a satisfactory alternative.
Although accounting for the child's individuality, such a focus does
not sufficiently address the practical and ethical limitations of attorneys representing precapacitated children.
Professor Guggenheim suggests that attorneys for precapacitated
children should represent the children's legal interests as defined
under the law.32 Similarly, the Proposed ABA Standards suggest that
"the lawyer's primary duty must still be focused on the protection of
the legal fights of the child client. '33 The mandate to protect the
child's legal interests or rights is an advance, particularly in light of the
concerns child advocates have raised about the lack of standards for
representing children and the all-too-common, unprincipled decision
making "on behalf of" children.3 Defining the scope of representation as the protection of the child's legal interests, however, provides
only limited guidance. First, courts have not always applied constitutional doctrines consistently with regard to children's rights. 35 Thus,
31. The Conference Recommendations do, nevertheless, limit the scope of deci-

sions that can be made for the precapacitated client based on the child's legal, as
opposed to other, interests. Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, part
IV.B.3.
32. See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1411.
33. Proposed ABA Standards, supra note 28, Preface (emphasis added)..
Although these standards contemplate that the child will define the scope of representation, id§ IA-1 cmt., the very young child cannot do so. Accordingly, I interpret
this prefatory language as defining the scope of representation for these precapacitated children.
34. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Susan Gluck Mezey, ConstitutionalAdjudication of Children'sRights
Claims in the United States Supreme Court, 1953-92, 27 Far. L.Q. 307, 321 (1993)
(noting the inconsistency in the Supreme Court's treatment of children's constitutional claims.)
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the attorney representing a child may be uncertain about what the
client's rights are, even when state law is clear. Second, even clearlydefined legal rights and interests may conflict. For example, a child
36
has the right to remain a part of his or her family of origin, yet a
child also has an interest in being protected from abusive or neglectful
parents.3 7 These interests may conflict, particularly when the facts of
a case indicate a level of abuse or neglect which is not severe or, as is
often the case, when it is unclear whether abuse or neglect has occurred. 38 Thus, instructing the lawyer to represent the child's legal
interests does not sufficiently direct the goals of litigation.
Nor does the legal interests model provide guidance as to what interests to pursue when the child's substantive legal rights may violate
the child's less defined constitutional rights. Consequently, this model
could limit constitutional challenges to, or defenses in, proceedings in
which the applicable substantive state or federal law may be unconstitutional. 39 If the child possessed the requisite capacity of a client as
contemplated under the Model Rules and Model Code, then he or she
could simply instruct the lawyer which right or claim to pursue, just as
an adult can instruct the attorney when or whether to exercise one
legal theory over another. 40 An infant, however, cannot provide such
instruction.
36. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 847 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Child Abuse and Prevention Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-294, 102
Stat. 102 (establishing comprehensive federal support and direction for state child
abuse prevention programs). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1989) (finding that a child does not have a constitutional
right to be protected by the state from abuse by their parents, even when the state
holds itself out as such a protector).
38. For example, such a situation occurs when a child has suffered a physical injury, such as a head injury, which could have been accidental or intentional.
39. For example, some children's rights litigation has been brought by children
challenging state laws or procedures on constitutional grounds not yet extended to
minors. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (striking down preponderance burden in juvenile delinquency adjudication proceedings and replacing it with
reasonable doubt burden); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that a regulation that banned school children's symbolic
acts of protest without a showing of substantial interference with school discipline or
rights of others violated students' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.) In these
cases, however, the children arguably had capacity to direct their attorneys. The
novel constitutional theories presented by attorneys for precapacitated clients in the
infamous "Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard" cases failed and advocacy of those theories led to protracted litigation resulting in inordinately long delays of custodial dispositions for those young clients. Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994) (denying claim
that a child has a due process right to a best interests hearing), denying cert. to 624
N.E.2d 181 (M11.); DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993) (same), denying cert. to 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich.). It is not clear whether the attorneys representing "Richard" and
"Jessica" served their clients well by advocating a process to which the children had
no legal right. Nevertheless, instances may exist in which precapacitated clients
would clearly benefit from pressing novel legal theories.
40. Similarly, the legal interests model provides little guidance regarding settlement. For example, Guggenheim suggests that a child has the right to have his or her
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Representing Corey's or Baby Girl's legal interests may direct the
lawyer, but may not necessarily lead to good outcomes. Both infants
have a right to be raised by their parents. Yet Baby Girl's mother has
said she wants the baby placed for adoption, although her mother has
not relinquished her parental rights. In addition, Baby Girl's father
has not come forward. By failing to register as her father, he may
have foregonethe parental right to oppose an adoption, 4 ' although he
may have a right to be involved in the child protection proceedings.
Yet even under this scenario, Baby Girl has no legal right to be
adopted. At best, there is a policy favoring permanent placement for
dependant children.4'

Given the absence of her parents, Baby Girl will benefit from being
placed as soon as possible with the family who will commit to raising
her through adulthood. Baby Girl, however, may also benefit from
knowing her biological father and his family;4 3 perhaps someone in his

family would be willing to care for her. Therefore, it would also be
beneficial for her attorney to search or insist on a search for her relatives. Such a search, however, would also take time, resulting in a
longer stay in foster care and its attendant risks of multiple placements.' In any event, if her attorney were to confine himself to representation of her legal interests, the clearest of which is to be
reunited with her parents, then he would not necessarily be helping
her because her parents do not appear to want her. Under the legal
interests model, her less defined interests in a permanent placement
and in knowing her birth family are difficult to prioritize and may be
trumped by her clear right to birth family integrity.
Corey's legal interests may also conflict with each other. On the
one hand, he has an interest in being raised by his mother. Yet he also
has a legal interest in remaining with a relative to whom he has
best interests in a custody matter decided by a judge, not the child's lawyer. Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1426. This construct suggests that the child's attorney could not
agree to settle a case, i.e., permit the parents or child welfare agencies to reach an
accord as to the child's best interest. Moreover, even if the attorney could settle on
behalf of the child, because the legal interests model prohibits the attorney from tak-

ing a position regarding the child's best interest, iL, it would also forbid the attorney
from assessing whether proposed settlement terms are even appropriate.
41. Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 750, para. 50/8 (Smith-Hurd 1995) (providing that putative
fathers who fail to register or hold themselves out as the child's father have no right to

contest the adoption of the child.)
42. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 627, 675(5) (requiring states to establish administrative or
judicial review to insure that foster children will find permanent placements either
through their returning home or adoption).
43. See Annette R. Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implicationsfor
CollaborativeAdoption Law and Practice,75 B.U. L. Rev. 997, 1015-18 (1995) (discussing the importance of birth families to adoptees).

44. See Andre P. Derdeyn, M.D., A Case for PermanentFoster Placement of Dependent, Neglected, and Abused Children, 47 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 604, 607 (1977)
("[F]oster care for many children

placements.").

.

.

.

may involve a number of different
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formed significant attachments.4 5 He too has an arguable legal interest in his relationship with his sister.46 In addition, his predominent
developmental interests lay in a stable, long-term home, which his
great aunt appears to be the best candidate to provide. Because Corey's interests seem to conflict, the legal interests model of representation may not provide his lawyer with sufficient guidance.
Guggenheim might suggest that the attorney present evidence as to
47
each interest, enabling the court to make the ultimate decision.
Although this is a solid, workable role for the child's representative,
this role could also be performed by a social worker or a specially
trained volunteer, also known as a Court Appointed Special Advocate
("CASA").
In sum, the focus on the scope of representation advances the discussion of child advocacy for precapacitated children and will hopefully spawn further discussion, development, and debate. Such a focus
may be troubling, however, to those child advocates who seek to empower children. Although the legal interests model may help retire
the all-too-prevalent practice of adult-focused, standardless decision
making on behalf of children,4 8 it may diminish children's presence in
their own legal proceedings.4 9 The next part addresses an alternative
to the legal interest model for representing precapacitated children.
Although this alternative model focuses on giving the child a voice,
little about the attorney-client relationship or the expertise of attorneys suggest that attorneys should represent very young children.
II.

CONVENTIONAL LEGAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION DOES NOT

EQUIP ATTORNEYS TO MAKE DECISIONS ON BEHALF OF
CHILDREN

The conferees recommended that "[d]ecision making on behalf of a
[precapacitated] child must be made in a contextual, self-aware, delib45. See, e.g., Edwards v. Livingston, 247 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ill. 1969) (stating that
although parent's right to custody is usually superior against a third person, in certain
circumstances, a third party may be awarded custody when in the child's interests).
46. See, e.g., Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (N.D. IM. 1989)

(presuming sibling contact to be in the best interests of foster care children); In re
Perkins/Pollnow, 779 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Ark. 1989) (upholding finding that it was in the
best interests of the child to be adopted by parents who had previously adopted the
child's siblings, rather than to be adopted by the child's actual custodian); In re
Anthony, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377, 381 (Fam. Ct. 1982) (holding that sibling contact was in
the best interests of the adoptee).

47. See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1426.
48. The findings of Robert Kelly and Sarah Ramsey demonstrate the absence of
such standards. For example, they note that the severity of problems that sweep children's cases into child protection proceedings do not necessarily determine whether
the foster care agency assumed custody of those children. Instead, the child's race,
parent's gender, effectiveness of parents' attorney, and the identity of the petitioner
predicted custodial outcomes. Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 1239-40.
49. As Catherine Ross reminds us: "After all, it is the child's world view we are
being asked to acknowledge." Ross, supra note 1, at [8].
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erate[,] and principled manner."50 After first determining the jurisdictional parameters5l of proceedings for which the attorney is
appointed, the attorney must "focus on the child in her context" by
conducting a "full, efficient, and speedy factual investigation with the
goal of achieving a detailed understanding of the child client's unique
personality, her family system, history[,] and daily life."'s2 To this end,
attorneys should be trained in interviewing and counseling children,
medical and psychiatric treatment of children's illnesses, and the various competing interdisciplinary theories pertinent to children's interests in legal proceedings.5 3 The attorney should also take repeated
"snapshot[s]" of the child at each step of the legal proceedings,
thereby capturing the child's development, behavior, and reactions in
his or her current surroundings.54
These prescriptions are apt, but nothing in the training of attorneys
prepares them to do these things.55 Law schools rarely (if at all) offer
courses on child development;5 6 and questions about family systems
typically do not appear on bar exams. Indeed, such useful subjects for
resolving disputes regarding children as negotiation and alternative
dispute resolution have joined the law school lexicon only relatively
recently. Attorneys review documents, investigate locations of incidents, and interview witnesses. Attorneys listen to what their clients
say. Understanding a child's personality, psychological theories of attachment, loss, and genealogical bewilderment, while being sensitive
to racial, class, and cultural differences5 7 is not necessarily part of an
attorney's training or expertise.
Indeed, representation of Baby Girl Smith will involve little factfinding because her life has been so short. Certainly her attorney
should investigate potential long-term or adoptive placements, exert
50. Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, part IV.B.2.

51. That is, what interests the legal proceeding has authority to address. See id.
part IV.B.3.
52. Id. part IV.B.3.b.
53. Id. part IV.C.1; see also Report-Interviewingand Counseling, supra note 30,
at 1351-52; Peters, supra note 17, at 1542-54; Margulies, supra note 9, at 1494-95.
54. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, at 1301 (part IV.B.3.c).
55. Indeed, the conferees acknowledged as much. Id. part IV.B.2 ("Nothing about
legal training or traditional legal roles qualifies lawyers to make decisions on behalf of
their clients."); see also, Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of
Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An EmpiricalLook at What Constitutes
Effective Representation,20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 341, 351 (1987) (noting attorneys know
little about child maltreatment or the physical, psychological, emotional, and cogni-

tive needs and development of children).
56. The conferees also recommended additions to law school curricula including:
(1) training in interviewing, counseling, and special ethical and practice issues relating

to representation of children; and (2) the creation of law school clinical child advocacy
programs. See Recommendations of the Conference, supra note 3, part II.B.4.
57. See id. part IV.B.2 ("References to the lawyer's own childhood, stereotypical
views of clients whose backgrounds differ from the lawyer's, and the lawyer's lay understanding of child development and children's needs should be considered highly
suspect bases for decision making on behalf of her client.").
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pressure to locate her family members (although finding them may
delay the adoptive placement and could result in a custodial change
for her at a tender developmental stage), and review her medical
records to determine if she has any special medical needs or identified
developmental limitations. After that, representation will depend on
child development theory: (1) how quickly ought a permanent placement be found for the child; (2) what adverse effects may the child
suffer if she is moved at various ages; and (3) which risk is greater, loss
of birth relationships or possible multiple placements. Attorneys do
not receive the training necessary to make these Solomonic
judgments.
On the contrary, law schools and law firms, for the most part, train
attorneys to analyze law and fact and to win cases on behalf of their
clients. Yet disputes involving young children are not so simple. Not
only is it unclear what winning means for these clients, but often one
legal outcome, though beneficial to the child, will also entail losses for
that child. Corey, for example, should not be pitted against his
mother or his great aunt. He will derive some benefit from each custodial choice and surely will suffer (presently or in the future) if deprived of either one or of contact with his sister. In short, litigation
involving children like Corey does not fit nicely into the standard lawsuit paradigm that is at the core of conventional attorney training.
Studies of attorneys for children suggest that, typically, attorneys
who have no special training regarding child representation make no
difference in outcomes for children and sometimes practice at substandard levels.58 Unfortunately, the vast majority of attorneys appointed to represent children (unlike many of the conferees) are not
specially-trained child advocates, but instead are general practitioners. 59 Moreover, atorneys constitute an expensive choice to fill a job
for which they may be iN-suited in the first place.. In fact, the poor
quality of some legal representation of children has been linked to low
compensation (relative to lawyers' scale), high caseloads, and judicial
concerns about the impact of hourly payment of these attorneys on
courts' coffers.6" By contrast, special training, devotion of sufficient
58. Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 55, at 388-89 (finding that well-trained lay
volunteers, attorneys, and law students performed similarly to each other and much
better compared to the nontrained court appointed attorneys); Kelly & Ramsey,
supra note 14, at 1238 (finding that appointment of attorneys for children had no
impact on case outcomes).
59. Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 55, at 391. Indeed, although the numbers
have surely increased in the past decade, by the mid-1980s, an extremely small percentage of attorneys specialized in child representation. Mnookin, supra note 11, at
48-50.
60. Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 1223-25; Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon
S. England, "I Know the Child is My Client, But Who Am 1?," 64 Fordham L. Rev.
1917, 1925 (1996); see also Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 55, at 348 (noting the low
fees paid to private attorneys representing children); Leonard P. Edwards, A Comprehensive Approach to the Representation of Children: The Child Advocacy Coordinat-
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time, continuity in representation, and direct contact with the client
comprise essential ingredients for effective child advocacy. 6
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions choose attorneys for children in
child protection proceedings merely because the attorneys have expressed an interest in representing children; many of these attorneys
bring to this task no special training in child advocacy and consequently may, despite good efforts and intentions, provide less than optimal representation to children.62 This state of affairs has led at least
two experts in the field of child representation to admonish: "[T]he
lack of training and the low fees paid to private attorneys representing
children sorely limit the ambitious child advocate's role suggested by
many commentators." 63 This is not to say that we should surrender
the idea of providing quality legal representation to children. Instead,
the admonition cautions against the routine appointment of attorneys
to represent precapacitated clients who have little to gain from the
conventional attorney-client relationship, but (because of their vulnerability) have much to lose from the appointment of an untrained
representative.
III.

LEGAL ETHics

RULES OBSTRUCT THE REPRESENTATION OF
VERY YOUNG CHILDREN

In addition to the unsuitability of attorneys for this type of representation in light of their training, the adversarial nature of their roles,
lack of ethical guidance, and the high cost of lawyers, the appointment
of an attorney may interfere with effective representation of the

young child because of the ethical rules which bind attorneys and the
very nature of such representation. Normally a court appoints an attorney to protect a client's sphere of interests. The flip-side of this
protection, particularly in the context of an adjudicatory proceeding,
is that the client's interests are, at least potentially, in opposition to
those of the other parties. 64 In adoption, child protection, and other
custody proceedings, the presumption underlying appointment of an
attorney for the child is that the child's interests are or may be adverse
to the parents, legal custodian or guardian, other custodial claimant,
and, in child protection proceedings, the state. Thus, the child is segregated from all other parties in a proceeding, which is, ostensibly,
ing Council, 27 Fain. L.Q. 417, 418-20 (1993) (noting the low pay of children's
attorneys as well as the low esteem in which they are held by the profession).
61. See Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 55, at 388-89; Heartz, supra note 26, at
339-40; Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 14, at 1238.
62. Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 55, at 391.
63. Id. at 348.
64. The comment to Model Rule 2.2 acknowledges this dynamic by noting that
when parties to a common transaction each have their own attorneys, additional complications and even litigation may ensue. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 2.2 cmt.
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about the child 65 and which involves parties who have some interest in
the child.
On the one hand, the purpose of appointing counsel for children is
to protect their own interests, which may or may not coincide with the
interests of the other parties. On the other hand, very young children-particularly the subjects of this Response-are not autonomous. Thus, for the reasons described above, they and their attorneys
may be at sea regarding the scope and goals of legal representation.
Unlike capacitated clients who can articulate-or at least actively assist counsel to discover-when the client's interests overlap with
others, very young clients cannot similarly guide their attorneys. Yet
the act of appointing an attorney for such young children sets up an
adversarial relationship, with attendant ethical obligations that actually interfere with the attorney's ability to discover the client's interests, particularly to the extent that these interests are shared with or
related to those of other parties to the litigation. For example, these
other parties-and their relations-may possess important information and insights regarding the child. Nevertheless, this information
now is less accessible to the attorney not only because of the reticence
people have about speaking with attorneys, but because the attorney
is constrained by ethical rules from gathering and presenting such
information.
The most interpositional ethical rule in this context is the rule
prohibiting communication with a person represented by counsel.
Model Rule 4.2 states that "a lawyer shall not communicate about the
subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."66 The
Model Code contains essentially the same proscription. 67 An appropriate and necessary ethical rule, this prohibition against speaking to
represented parties nevertheless hampers the attorney representing
the precapacitated child because the key parties who can provide context to the child's life, for example, the parents or other relatives or
guardians who are contesting or seeking custody, are likely to be rep-

65. The issues of whether custodial proceedings really concern children and at
what point children's interests diverge from their parents-although related to the
presumption of the need for appointment of separate counsel-extend beyond the
scope of this Response. For a discussion of the limited degree to which child welfare
and custodial disputes sometimes involve children's interest, see Martin Guggenheim,
The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado About Nothing?, in Child, Parent & State
27,29 (S. Randall Humm et al. eds., 1994); Robert H. Mnookin, supranote 11. For a
discussion about when and why children's and parent's interests conflict, see Annette
R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, ParentalRights vs. Best Interests of the Child: A False
Dichotomy?, 2 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y 63 (1995).
66. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 4.2.
67. Model Code, supra note 4, DR 7-104(A)(1).
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resented and therefore are off limits to the infant's attorney. 68
Although opposing counsel may permit the client to speak with the
child's attorney without presence of counsel, the opposing attorney
may be hesitant if the client's interests are or could be at odds with the
child's. Often the child's attorney will not know how those interests
coincide or diverge until that attorney can investigate the child's
situation.
Take 'the case of Corey Thomas. He is ten months old, healthy,
happy, and developmentally appropriate. His representative cannot
ask him who has been caring for him these past ten months; where he
has been living; whether his mother feeds and plays with him, or
whether others perform this caregiving; how many babysitters he has
had; and whether he has been well-cared for because of or despite his
mother. His attorney speaks to Corey's relatives (who are not represented) to attempt to understand what Corey's life has been like and
where, if anywhere, he considers home. His relatives are either reticent about sharing information with this stranger who says she is their
ten-month-old nephew's attorney, or simply do not know enough
about Corey's early life because they have not seen him every day.
They give the attorney different stories, depending on their experiences with Corey and their loyalties to Ms. Thomas, Corey's father,
or to Ms. Thomas' aunt who is seeking custody. Corey's attorney really needs to speak with and get to know Ms. Thomas if the attorney is
going to be able to understand who Corey is and what type of care Ms.
Thomas has provided, and can provide, for him. For similar reasons,
the attorney will also need to speak to Ms. Thomas' aunt. The attorney must be honest with the lawyers for the custody-seekers. She
should inform those attorneys of what information she is seeking and
what her concerns are. One or both of the attorneys may not give
consent to speak to their clients who could have much to lose by sharing troubling information with the child's attorney. Thus, Corey will
remain, at least in part, a mystery to his lawyer.
Even if the attorney could obtain the information necessary to
knov her client sufficiently to represent his interests, she would still
be hampered by the ethical rules prohibiting lawyers from acting as
witnesses. Model Rule 3.7 states that "[a] lawyer shall not act as advo68. Although in child protection proceedings, the state agency too may have important information about the child (which the caseworker acquires through interviews and other information gathering), the ethics rules probably would not prohibit
communications with the caseworker because the caseworker is not the client of the
attorney representing the state or the agency. See Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 4.2
cmt. (indicating that the rule prohibits communication only with managers and other
persons whose actions or omissions could be imputed to the organization for purposes
of admissions and legal liability); see also Samuel R. Miller & Angelo J. Calfo, Ex
Parte Contact with Employees and Former Employees of a CorporateAdversary: Is It

Ethical?,42 Bus. Law. 1053, 1060-71 (1987) (discussing ethical rules in the context of
communications with employees of a represented organization).

1996]

VERY YOUNG CHILDREN

1971

cate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness."6
The Model Code contains essentially the same prohibition.7" This
proscription would bar the attorney who obtains direct evidence of
her own (for example, she witnessed something directly or has information which can be used for impeachment) from presenting that evi71
dence to the court or would require the attorney to be disqualified.
Similarly, the attorney would not be able to argue a position on behalf
of the client because of ethical rules that prohibit attorneys from making assertions which are based 72on personal knowledge or are unsupported by admissible evidence.
The attorney for a precapacitated child is thus in a double bind.
The rules first hamper her investigation of the client's interests. Then
the rules limit her use of the information she obtains through her investigation. Although when applied in children's cases, these rules
undermine the court's ability to see and hear the child, they are based
on sound policy and should not be sacrificed. Instead, they question
the propriety of appointing lawyers to represent children.
PROPOSAL FOR A MULTIDISCIPLINARY MODEL FOR
REPRESENTATION OF PRECAPACITATED CHILDREN

IV. A

Rather than appointing attorneys to represent very young children,

the appointment of specialized social workers or trained lay advocates

69. Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 3.7(a).
70. Model Code, supra note 4, DR 5-102(A).
71. Model Rule 3.7(a)(3) provides that disqualification is not necessary if it would
"work substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer
or his firm as counsel in the particular case." Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule
3.7(a)(3). Similarly, DR 5-101(B)(4) permits testimony from the attorney when "refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value
of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular case." Model Code, supra note 4,
DR 5-101(B)(4). Perhaps when representing young children, attorneys should be permitted to testify in situations where disqualification or not testifying would "work a
substantial hardship on the client," such an outcome would constitute an exception to
the ethical rules which govern attorney conduct. Id.
72. Model Rule 3.4(e) states that an attorney in trial may not
allude to any matter that ... will not be supported by admissible evidence,
assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility
of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused.
Model Rules, supra note 4, Rule 3.4(e). The Model Code contains essentially the
same prohibitions in DR 7-106 (C)(1), (3) & (4). Model Code, supra note 4, DR 7-106
(C)(1), (3) & (4).
These rules also protect the litigants' due process rights. As Professor Guggenheim
writes:
A... due process concern arises when lawyers are authorized to engage in a
fact-finding mission and then seek to influence a court to reach an outcome
that they have concluded is correct. The process by which they reached that
conclusion cannot be subjected to meaningful inquiry.
See Guggenheim, supra note 6, at 1415.
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as GALs7 3 to represent the interests of precapacitated children may

mitigate or avoid some of the problems discussed above.7 4 The GAL
model would not place the child automatically at odds with the other
parties. Instead, the model would guarantee the child an independent
representative who can be counted on to give the child a voice in the
proceedings. These GALs would not be bound by the attorney's ethical rules, 7 5 so the nonattorney GAL could interview and observe represented parties. Like any other party, including the child with
capacity, the GAL could testify if necessary.
Nevertheless, trained GALs should have access to the advice, consultation, and advocacy of attorneys. After all, child protection and
custody proceedings occur in a legal arena where all other parties are
represented by legal counsel; judges themselves are attorneys. Just as
nothing in legal training prepares lawyers to make assessments about
children, social workers and other nonattorneys are not necessarily
trained in the law or oral presentation skills. Nonlawyers may be unable to recognize legal issues, legal interests, and the need for taking
legal action; they are also unlikely to be skilled in motion practice,
presentation of evidence, and the development of legal argument.
Those activities are uniquely attorney functions.
A nonlawyer representing a child should, then, have access to an
attorney to assist in the presentation or defense of the precapacitated
child's legal interests in court. For example, a child may want or need
a change in parent-child visitation parameters. Without the ability to
bring such matters to the court's attention, which in some jurisdictions
may occur only through motion practice, all of the GAL's factfinding
and assessments made regarding the child will not be very useful.
Thus, it would not do for the child to be the only party without legal
representation. Moreover, given increasing fiscal constraints, a model
in which specifically trained GALs represent young children and attorneys represent the GALs may be more cost-effective because the
73. GAL is a loaded and in-defined term. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 1, at 289
("[T]he definition [of GAL] has broadened to include a variety of kinds of representation, and therefore does not clearly indicate what is expected."); Roy T. Stuckey,
GuardiansAd Litem as SurrogateParents: Implications for Role Definition and Con-

fidentiality, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1785, 1786 (1996) (noting that courts failed to define
accurately the roles, responsibilities, and loyalties of GALs, and that the purported
purposes and scope of the representation may conflict within a single appointment). I
use the term here to refer to the kind of representation outlined in the Recommenda-

tions of the Conference and Professor Peters' article. See Recommendations of the
Conference, supra note 3, part IV; Peters, supra note 17, at 1525-29.

74. This is hardly a novel idea. Others have suggested a lay GAL model. See, e.g.,
Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 55, at 388-89 (discussing a study, that found that
trained lay volunteers were effective child advocates); Heartz, supranote 26, at 33641 (advocating volunteer GAL or CASA programs to represent children).
75. Being free from these rules presents some drawbacks. The beauty of the attorney-client model is its twin mandates of loyalty and zealous advocacy-two duties
which children of any age should be owed, particularly given children's inherent and
historical difficulty in being seen and heard by the court.

1996]

VERY YOUNG CHILDREN

1973

bulk of the work-investigation and client contact-will be performed by the nonlawyers and less work will be performed by (the
more expensive) attorneys, who will conduct purely legal work on behalf of the GALS.
CONCLUSION

The GAL role has been ill-defined and abused over the years.
Many child advocates now view the position with disdain, perhaps
rightly so. Notwithstanding its many weaknesses, the GAL model
may nevertheless be the most meaningful and effective one for those
infants and young children who have little to gain through the traditional attorney-client model. Yet once children have the capacity to
make relevant legal decisions, they should be appointed an attorney,
rather than a GAL. Moreover, child custody and child protection proceedings may last for years, so some mechanism should be developed
to insure that children who come into the court system needing a
GAL are appointed an attorney when they reach the developmental
stage where they can make and articulate even the most rudimentary
logical decisions. 76

76. See Ross, supra note 1, at 1-578 (cautioning against discounting children's views
because their capacities are not as developed as adults).

